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6 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
7 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**  
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9 Kim Cramton,

10 Plaintiff,

11 v.

12 Grabbagreen Franchising LLC, et al.,

13 Defendants.  
14

No. CV-17-04663-PHX-DWL

**ORDER**

15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to seal (Doc. 257), which seeks to  
16 seal portions of her Motion in Limine No. 3 ("MIL 3") and Motion in Limine No. 4 ("MIL  
17 4"), redacted versions of which are filed (Docs. 260, 261) and unredacted versions of which  
18 are lodged under seal (Docs. 263, 264).

19 The public has a general right to inspect judicial records and documents, such that  
20 a party seeking to seal a judicial record must overcome "a strong presumption in favor of  
21 access." *Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu*, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). To  
22 do so, the party generally must "articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual  
23 findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring  
24 disclosure . . . ." *Id.* at 1178-79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court  
25 must then "conscientiously balance the competing interests of the public and the party who  
26 seeks to keep certain judicial records secret." *Id.* at 1179 (internal quotation marks  
27 omitted). "After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial  
28 records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for

1 its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks  
2 omitted).

3 This “stringent” compelling reasons standard applies to all filed motions and their  
4 attachments where the motion is “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.”  
5 *Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC*, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). A  
6 lower standard applies to “sealed materials attached to a discovery motion unrelated to the  
7 merits of a case,” which requires only that a party establish “good cause” for sealing. *Id.*  
8 at 1097. Motions in limine are not discovery motions, and the Ninth Circuit has stated that  
9 “plenty of technically nondispositive motions—including routine motions in limine—are  
10 strongly correlative to the merits of a case.” *Id.* at 1099. Plaintiff’s motion to seal assumes  
11 that the “compelling reasons” standard applies. (Doc. 257 at 2.)

12 The arguments proffered in Plaintiff’s motion do not satisfy the “compelling  
13 reasons” standard. Plaintiff’s contention that the material was designated confidential  
14 under the Court’s protective order is unavailing—that does not justify sealing. (Doc. 57 at  
15 6 [protective order: “Before any [materials designated as confidential] are filed with the  
16 Court for any purpose, the party seeking to file such material must seek permission of the  
17 Court to file the material under seal. Nothing in this order shall be construed as  
18 automatically permitting a party to file under seal.”].) Additionally, although some of the  
19 topics addressed in MIL 3 and MIL 4 may be embarrassing and unflattering, “[t]he mere  
20 fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination,  
21 or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.”  
22 *Kamakana*, 447 F.3d at 1179. Finally, although it is true that many “district courts in the  
23 Ninth Circuit have held that the ‘sensitive and confidential nature of medical records’ is a  
24 compelling reason that” justifies sealing such records, *Gary v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.*,  
25 2018 WL 18111470, \*3 (D. Or. 2018) (canvassing cases), MIL 3 and MIL 4 do not contain  
26 information gleaned from anyone’s medical records.

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